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THE INTOXICATION DEFENCE 
Introduction 
Anyone who has worked even one 
day in patrol is acutely aware that 
drunkenness, whether from drugs 
and/or alcohol, is a factor in many 
incidents and offences in which the 
police become involved. The question 
is, however, when does the 
intoxication of the accused become 
such a significant factor that it can 
impact the outcome of a case by 
becoming a valid defence at law? The 
intoxication defence goes to the issue 
of intent. Similar to an insanity 
defence, the question becomes, was 
the accused in such a state of mind 
due to intoxication that she or he was 
unable to form the required intent to 
carry out the act in question? 
It is well established that a criminal 
offence cannot be proven unless 
someone possesses the required 
intent, or mens rea, to carry out the 
particular offence, or a lesser included 
offence, with which they have been 
charged. The "level" of intent to be 
proved, however, will vary depending 
on the particular offence involved. 
When dealing with the issue of intent 
there are two types of offences in our 
criminal law; those requiring the 
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Crown to prove only a "general" intent 
and those requiring proof ofa "specific" 
intent on the part of the accused. 
Just as the Criminal Code ("CC'? 
does not define · intent, so too it does 
not specify which offences require 
proof of specific intent and which are 
offences requiring proof of only general 
intent. Without getting too caught up in 
how offences are categorized, suffice 
it to say that, generally speaking, 
offences that require proof of specific 
intent are the more serious offences. 
For example, murder under s. 229 of 
the CC requires that the accused meant 
to cause the death of a person or meant 
to cause that person bodily harm that 
was likely to cause death and is thus 
an offence of specific intent. Assault 
(s. 265), on the other hand, is an 
offence requiring only proof of general 
intent, in that the Crown simply proves 
that it was the force that was applied to 
the victim intentionally, not the intent to 
cause injury. 
General Intent Offences 
The defence of drunkenness in 
relation to general intent offences was 
considered by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in both R. v.. Leary, 1 a pre-
Cha rter case, and following the 
proclamation of the Charter, in R. v.. 
Bernard. 2 In both cases it was held 
that the defence of drunkenness had 
no application to offences requiring 
f .; 
proof of only general intent. Further, 
in Bernard it was held that this result 
did not offend the Charter. According 
to Mcintyre J.: 
Criminal offences, as a general 
rule, must have as one of their 
elements the requirement of a 
blameworthy mental state. The 
morally innocent ought not to be 
convicted .... The Leary rule 
recognizes that accused persons 
who have voluntarily consumed 
drugs or alcohol, thereby 
depriving themselves of self-
control leading to the commission 
of a crime, are not morally 
innocent and are, indeed, 
criminally blameworthy.3 
Mcintyre J. was clearly aware of 
the effects of intoxication on crime in 
particular, and society in general, and 
felt that the public interest was 
satisfied by not having an intoxication 
defence open to accused persons in 
relation to general intent offences: 
As I have endeavoured to show, 
the exclusion of the drunkenness 
defence in general intent cases 
is not without logical 
underpinnings but, whatever the 
logical weaknesses may be, an 
overwhelming justification for the 
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exclusion may rest on policy, 
policy so compelling that it 
possesses its own logic. 
Intoxication, whether by alcohol 
or drugs, lies at the root of many 
if not most violent assaults: 
intoxication is clearly a major 
cause of violent crime. What then 
is preferable, a recognition of this 
fact and the adoption of a policy 
aimed at curbing the problem, or 
the application of what is said to 
be logic by providing in law that 
he who voluntarily partakes of that 
which is the cause of the crime 
should for that reason be excused 
from the consequence of his 
crime? If that is logic, I prefer 
policy.4 
More recently, in R. v. Davia ult, 5 
however, the sec reconsidered the 
issue. In this case the accused, a 
chronic alcoholic, was charged with 
the sexual assault of a 65 year old 
partially paralyzed and wheelchair 
bound female. While not specifically 
overruling either Leary or Bernard, the 
majority found that the prior rules did 
offend the Charter and held that the 
defence of drunkenness should be 
available in general intent offences. 
According to Cory J., proof of intent 
is fundamental to our justice system 
and an accused should not be denied 
the requirement that the Crown prove 
all essential elements of an offence: 
In my view, the strict application 
of the Leary rule offends both ss. 
7 and 11 {d) of the Charter for a 
number of reasons. The mental 
aspect of an offence, or mens 
rea, has long been recognized 
as an integral part of crime. The 
concept is fundamental to our 
criminal law. That element may 
be minimal in general intent 
offences; nonetheless, it exists. 
In this case, the requisite mental 
element is simply an intention to 
commit the sexual assault or 
recklessness as to whether the 
action will constitute an assault. 
The necessary mental element 
can ordinarily be inferred from 
the proof that the assault was 
committed by the accused. 
However, the substituted mens 
rea of an intention to become 
drunk cannot establish the mens 
rea to commit the assault.6 
Daviault dealt with a chronic 
alcoholic accused whose defence was 
that his extreme intoxication put him 
into a state where he was no longer 
capable of forming any intent 
whatsoever, be it specific or general. 
The SCC felt that this argument and, 
thus this defence, would only be 
available in the rarest of cases. Cory 
J. stated: 
In summary, I am of the view that 
to deny that even a very minimal 
mental element is required for 
sexual assault offends the Charter 
in a manner that is so drastic and 
so contrary to the principles of 
fundamental justice that it cannot 
be justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter. The experience of other 
jurisdictions which have 
completely abandoned the Leary 
rule, coupled with the fact that 
under the proposed approach, 
the defence would be available 
only in the rarest of cases, 
demonstrale that there is no 
urgent policy or pressing 
objective which need to be 
addressed. Studies on the 
relationship between intoxication 
and crime do not establish any 
rational link. Finally, as the Leary 
rule applies to all crimes of 
general intent, it cannot be said 
to be well tailored to address a 
particular objective and it would 
not meet either the proportionality 
or the minimum impairment 
requirements [in order to justify 
its continued support in relation 
to the Charterj7 . 
Following the release of Daviault, 
Parliament enacted s. 33.1 of the CC 
to deal with the defence of self-induced 
intoxication. 8 The intoxication 
defence, in certain circumstances, is 
now limited; moreover, it is unavailable 
to an accused charged with certain 
types of offences. For the section to 
be operative the offence must include, 
as an element of the offence, an 
assault or any other interference or 
threat of interference by the accused 
with the bodily integrity of another 
person. If, during the commission of 
the offence, the accused lacked the 
general intent or the voluntariness 
required to commit the offence by 
reason of self-induced intoxication, the 
intoxication defence is negated. A 
further requirement is that during the 
commission of the offence the 
accused must depart markedly from a 
noted standard of care. That standard 
of care, noted in ss. (2), is defined as: 
A person departs markedly from 
the standard of reasonable care 
generally recognized in Canadian 
society and is thereby criminally 
at fault where the person, while 
in a state of self-induced 
intoxication that renders the 
person unaware of, or incapable 
of consciously controlling, their 
behaviour, voluntarily or 
involuntarily interferes or 
threatens to interfere· with the 
bodily integrity of another person. 
While it is, as yet, unknown, how 
the courts will deal with this section in 
relation to all of the general intent type 
offences, the enactment makes it clear 
that the defence will no longer be 
available in cases of sexual assault like 
that in Daviault. 
Specific Intent Offences 
In cases where the Crown must 
establish a specific intent on the part 
of the accused to have done the 
charged act, the burden on the Crown 
is somewhat greater than for general 
intent offences. When dealing with the 
issue of intoxication in specific intent 
offences, the courts in Canada, since 
the early part of this century, have 
followed English precedent and held 
that intoxication was irrelevant save 
where it could be shown that the 
intoxicant had removed the accused's 
capacity to form the necessary intent.9 
The question, until recently, was 
whether the accused, given his or her 
state of intoxication, was capable of 
forming the specific intent required for 
the offence? That issue was revisited 
by the SCC in 1996 in R. v. 
Robinson. 10 
In determining in Robinson that the 
prior rules offended the Charter the 
sec firmly established new guidelines 
when dealing with the issue of 
intoxication. First, it must be 
established that there is some basis 
for a defence based on intoxication: 
[B]efore a trial judge is required 
by law to charge the jury on 
intoxication, he or she must be 
satisfied that the effect of the 
intoxication was such that its 
effect might have impaired the 
accused's foresight of 
consequences sufficiently to 
raise a reasonable doubt. Once 
a judge is satisfied that this 
threshold is met, he or she must 
then make it clear to the jury that 
the issue before them is whether 
the Crown has satisfied them 
beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused had the requisite 
intent. In the case of murder the 
issue is whether the accused 
intended to kill or cause bodily 
hard with the foresight that the 
likely consequence was death.11 
(emphasis in original) 
In other words, before the defence 
can even be put to a jury there must 
be an air of reality to the defence. If 
that is the case, then the issue of intent 
becomes one of fact; has the Crown 
established beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused committed the 
offence with the required intent. As 
Lamer C.J.C. noted, "it is my opinion 
that intoxication short of incapacity will 
in most cases rarely raise a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of 
jurors".12 
When the defence of intoxication 
is employed by an accused in an 
indictment requiring proof of specific 
intent it is particularly important the 
trial judge properly instruct on that 
issue. In particular, care must be 
taken that the jury does not ignore the 
intoxication defence and 
over-emphasize the idea that a "sober 
and sane person" usually intends the 
natural and probable consequences 
of her or his actions. 
That matter was made very clear in 
two recent B.C. cases on this issue, 
R. v. Henry and Riley13 and R. v. 
Frechette. 14 In Henry and Riley the 
BCCA ordered a new first degree 
murder trial where the trial judge failed 
to properly instruct the jury on the issue 
of intoxication. In Frechette, released 
within days of the Henry and Riley 
decision, a separate three judge BCCA 
came to a similar conclusion when 
dealing with a charge of second degree 
murder. As the Court noted: 
... the trial judge did not expressly 
draw a link between the common 
sense inference and the effect of 
intoxication on that inference. In 
other words, he did not instruct 
the jury that evidence of 
intoxication could rebut the 
common sense inference [that a 
sober and sane person could not 
have committed the act in question 
without the required intent].15 
Conclusion 
The issue of intoxication cannot be 
dismissed during the investigative stage 
of any offence. Investigating officers 
must thoroughly document any 
evidence or observation that may relate 
to an accused's state of intoxication. 
Consideration should also be given to 
the use of other investigative aids (e.g. 
breathalyzer). 
Endnotes: 
1
· R. v. Leary(1978), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 473 
(S.C.C.). 
2
· R. v. 8emard(1988), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 1 
(S.C.C.). 
3
· Ibid., at 37. 
4
· Ibid., at 36. 
5
· R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63. 
6
· Ibid., at approx. 79. 
7
· Ibid., at approx. 80. 
8
· s.c. 1995, c. 32, s. 1. 
9
· MacAskill v. The King, [1931) S.C.R. 330. 
10
· R. v. Robinson, [1996] S.C.R. 683. 
11
· Ibid., at para. 48. 
12
· Ibid., at para. 52. 
13
· R. v. Henry and Riley(19January1999), 
Van Reg. 0022.99 (B.C.C.A.). 
14
· R. v. Frechette (27 January 1999), Vic. Reg. 
0046.00 (B.C.C.A.). 
15
· Ibid., at para. 20. 
3 
CONSENT SEARCHES 
Introduction 
It is not uncommon for police 
officers in the course of their duties to 
rely on the consent of an individual to 
conduct a search. Such consent is 
often routinely relied upon by police 
officers to search individuals (i.e. 
asking an individual to empty out his 
or her pockets), to search an 
automobile (i.e. asking an individual 
to open the trunk), or even to search 
a residence or room. While reliance 
on the consent of an individual may 
have certain practical advantages, it 
is not without its pitfalls for the unwary 
police officer. The purpose of this 
paper is to canvas the factors 
considered by the courts when 
considering whether or not the 
investigating officer has obtained valid 
and proper consent to conduct a 
search. 
Two Approaches 
A review of the case law reveals 
two divergent views concerning what 
constitutes valid and effective consent 
to a police search. The first approach 
focuses on the voluntariness of the 
decision to consent to the search. 
According to this narrow view, consent 
simply means that the individual "made 
a conscious and voluntary choice, 
free from threats, inducements or 
intimidation."1 This test for determining 
whether a person has consented to a 
police search is analogous to that 
applied when determining the 
admissibility of a confession. The 
second approach posits that mere 
voluntariness is not sufficient to 
establish valid consent to a police 
search. Rather, the individual must 
also have some appreciation of the 
potential consequences of giving the 
consent so that he or she might make 
a meaningful decision to give consent 
or not. ·2 This latter approach clearly 
places a more onerous burden on 
police officers when they seek to rely 
on consent to conduct a search. 
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In Search and Seizure Law in 
Canada, the authors describe these two 
divergent views of consent as follows: 
Consent to a search may mean 
that the consenter made a free 
choice, unrestrained by threats or 
inducements, and voluntarily 
allowed the search to occur. On 
the other hand, consent to a 
search may mean that the 
consenter, in full knowledge of the 
legal right to refuse and knowing 
the consequences of consent, 
voluntarily waives the right not to 
be searched.3 
The balance of this article will discuss 
the cases of R. v. Wills4 and R. v. 
Borden5 , two leading decisions on 
consent searches. It is clear from a 
review of these two decisions that the 
courts in Canada have rejected the 
narrow "voluntariness" test in favour of 
the broader ''waiver'' test when dealing 
with the issue of consent searches. 
Wills and Borden 
At issue in R. v. Wi/Js, was whether 
or not a breath sample obtained 
''voluntarily" from the driver of a motor 
vehicle could be admitted at trial. Mr. 
Wills was the driver of a motor vehicle 
involved in a fatal motor vehicle 
accident. Though the investigating 
officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Wills' 
breath, he did not have any reason to 
believe that he was impaired. When 
Mr. Wills' admitted that he may have 
had something to drink earlier that 
evening, one of the investigating 
officers demanded that he provide a 
breath sample for an approved 
roadside screening device. The 
roadside screening device registered 
a ''warn", indicating that Mr. Wills had 
a blood alcohol concentration of 
between .05 and .1 milligrams of 
alcohol. Based on the test result and 
his observations, the investigating 
officer concluded that Mr. Wills was 
likely not over the legal limit when the 
accident occurred. He decided that 
he would not be laying any drinking/ 
driving related charges, but had not 
ruled out laying other motor vehicle 
related charges. 
Though he did not have any 
grounds to demand that Mr. Wills 
submit to a breathalyser test, the 
investigating officer suggested that 
Mr. Wills take a breathalyser test to 
provide evidence in the event of a civil 
action. He advised Mr. Wills that the 
breathalyser test would allow Mr. Wills 
to establish his exact blood alcohol level. 
Before Mr. Wills took the breathalyser 
test, the investigating officer said "Tim, 
you understand that you don't have to 
provide this sample and you are doing 
this of your own free will." Mr. Wills 
replied that he understood. Mr. Wills 
provided the breath sample for the 
breathalyser test, and a reading of 1 .28 
milligrams of alcohol was registered. It 
was subsequently determined that the 
roadside screening device used in the 
initial test was not functioning properly 
because of inaccurate calibration. 
The issue before the Ontario Court 
of Appeal was whether or not Mr. Wills 
had validly consented to the taking of a 
breath sample. Doherty J.A. stated the 
issue as follows: "There is no doubt that 
Mr. Wills agreed to the taking of the 
sample. The question is, was his 
consent an effective one or was it vitiated 
by non-disclosure or innocent 
misrepresentation of the material 
facts?"6 
If the test to be applied was simply 
that of voluntariness, it was clear on the 
evidence that the Crown had discharged 
the burden of establishing that Mr. Wills 
had given valid consent to provide a 
breath sample: Mr. Wills was aware that 
he was under no obligation to provide a 
breath sample; he made the decision to 
provide a breath sample freely, and after 
consulting with his father; and the police 
conduct did not amount to inducement, 
coercion or oppression. However, 
Doherty, J.A. rejected the narrow test 
of voluntariness, stating: 
In my opinion, the requirements 
established by the Supreme Court 
of Canada for a valid waiver of a 
constitutional right, are applicable 
to the determination of whether an 
effective consent was given to an 
alleged seizure by police. The 
fairness principal which has 
defined the requirements of a valid 
waiver as they relate to the right to 
a trial within a reasonable time, or 
the right to counsel, has equal 
application to the right protected 
by s. 8. In each instance, the 
authorities seek an individual's 
permission to do something 
which, without that permission, 
they are not entitled to do. In 
such cases, fairness demands 
that the individual make a 
voluntary and informed 
decision to permit the intrusion 
of the investigative process 
upon his or her constitutionally 
protected rights.7 
When the police rely on the 
consent of an individual as their 
basis for a search and seizure, 
Doherty, J.A. held that the Crown 
must establish, on the balance of 
probabilities, that: 
1. There was consent, expressed or 
implied; 
2. The giver of the consent had the 
authority to give the consent in 
question; 
3. The consent was voluntary in the 
sense that it was not the product 
of police oppression, coercion or 
other external conduct which 
negated the freedom to choose 
whether or not to allow the police 
to pursue the course of conduct 
requested; 
4. The giver of the consent was 
aware of the nature of the police 
conduct he or she was being 
asked to consent to; 
5. The giver of the consent was 
aware of his or her right to refuse 
to permit the police to engage in 
the conduct requested; and 
6. The giver of the consent was 
aware of the potential 
consequences of giving that 
consent.8 
It was clear on the facts of the 
case that the Crown had established 
that the first five requirements had 
been met. However, Doherty, J.A. 
held that the Crown had failed to 
establish that Mr. Wills was 
sufficiently aware of the potential 
consequences of consenting to 
provide a breath sample. 
Specifically, Mr. Wills was not 
informed that the breathalyser test 
results would be used to assist the 
investigating officer in his ongoing 
investigation into the accident, nor was 
he aware that one of his passengers 
had died and another was seriously 
injured. Further, Mr. Wills was misled 
as to the potential criminal 
consequences of taking a breathalyser 
test by the results of the roadside 
screening device. Thus, Mr. Wills' lack 
of appreciation of the consequences of 
providing a breath sample vitiated his 
consent. 
In Borden, the SCC considered the 
test adopted by Doherty J.A. in Wills. 
The accused was arrested pursuant to 
a warrant issued in connection with a 
sexual assault on a woman at a motel 
("December Assault"). No sexual 
intercourse or ejaculation occurred in 
the December Assault, but the police 
seized a number of items from the motel 
room, including two strands of hair. The 
complainant had seen Mr. Borden on 
previous occasions, and was able to 
identify him in a photo line-up as her 
assailant. At the time of his arrest, Mr. 
Borden was also a suspect in a sexual 
assault of an elderly woman in her home 
("October Assaulf'). In that case, the 
complainant was unable to identify her 
assailant. However, the police seized a 
comforter stained with semen. 
Mr. Borden was cooperative with the 
investigating officers throughout their 
investigation. He made an oral 
exculpatory statement in connection 
with the December Assault. Contrary 
to his counsel's advice, he subsequently 
agreed to reduce his oral statement to 
writing. He also cooperated in providing 
samples of scalp and pubic hair. The 
officers then debated amongst 
themselves whether to request a blood 
sample from Mr. Borden. Iacobucci J. 
noted that "[t]he officers testified that, 
while the sample had some utility in the 
investigation of the motel offence, they 
wanted it "mainly" or "mostly'' for the 
investigation of the October assault of 
the elderly woman, in order to compare 
the blood with the semen found on her 
comforter."9 
Mr. Borden complied with the 
investigating officers' request to provide 
a blood sample. He signed a written 
consent form permitting the officers "to 
take a sample of my blood for purposes 
relating to their investigations". Apart 
from the use of the plural 
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"investigations", Mr. Borden was given 
no indication that the blood sample 
was being sought for use in the 
investigation of the October Assault, 
nor was he ever informed by the 
investigating officers that he was a 
suspect in the October Assault. The 
blood sample was analyzed and 
found to match the semen found on 
the comforter, and Mr. Borden was 
charged with the sexual assault of the 
elderly woman. 
The principal issue before the SCC 
was whether or not Mr. Borden had 
validly consented to the seizure of his 
blood in relation to the police 
investigation of the October Assault. 
The Crown, relying on the decision 
of the SCC in R. v. Mellenthin10 , 
submitted that the proper (i.e. narrow) 
test to apply in assessing whether an 
individual has consented to a police 
search was one of voluntariness. 
In Mellenthin the SCC considered 
a search conducted during a road 
block set up as part of a program to 
check motor vehicles. Although the 
police officer saw neither liquor or 
drugs inside the vehicle, he saw an 
open gym bag on the front seat beside 
Mr. Mellenthin. Inside the gym bag was 
a small brown bag with a plastic 
sandwich bag in it. In response to 
the police officer's questioning, Mr. 
Mellenthin opened the bag. The 
officer saw that the bag contained 
glass viles which he testified were 
commonly used to store cannabis 
resin. As a result, the officer believed 
he had reasonable probable grounds 
to believe that narcotics were present 
in the vehicle. He conducted a further 
search of the vehicle and found viles 
of hash oil and marijuana joints. 
In considering whether the opening 
of the gym bag by Mr. Mellenthin 
amounted to consenting to a search, 
Cory J. stated: 
It has been seen that as a result 
of the check stop the appellant 
was detained. The arbitrary 
detention was imposed as soon 
as he was pulled over. As a result 
of that detention, it can 
reasonably be inferred that the 
appellant felt compelled to 
respond to questions put to him 
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by the officer. In those 
circumstances, it is incumbent 
upon the Crown to address that 
the person detained had indeed 
made an informed consent to the 
search based on an awareness 
of his rights to refuse to respond 
to the questions or to consent 
to the search. There is no such 
evidence in this case. In my view, 
the judge was correct in her 
conclusion that the defendant felt 
compelled to respond to the 
police questions. In the 
circumstances, it cannot be said 
that the search was 
consensual.11 (emphasis added) 
In Borden, Iacobucci, J. rejected 
the Crown's submission that the 
highlighted portion of this passage from 
Mellenthin supported the adoption of 
the narrow ''voluntariness" test: 
With regard to the test to be 
applied, I cannot find that the 
decision of this court in Mellenthin, 
supra, is of assistance to the 
appellant. While it is true that 
Cory, J. in that case stated at page 
624 that it was, " ... incumbent upon 
the Crown to deduce evidence that 
the person detained had indeed 
made an informed consent to the 
search based upon awareness of 
his rights to refuse to respond to 
the questions or to consent to the 
search", I cannot interpret this 
assertion as purporting to set out 
an exhaustive state of a general 
test for the requirements for a valid 
consent to a police search.12 
Iacobucci, J. noted that it was not 
necessary in Mellenthin to consider 
whether the accused needed to be 
aware of the consequences of his 
consent, as the real issue was simply 
whether or not the accused knew 
whether or not he was required to show 
the officer the contents of his bag. 
Iacobucci, J. favoured the broad 
approach adopted in Wills: 
In order for a waiver of the right 
to be secure against 
unreasonable seizure to be 
effective, the person purporting 
to consent must be possessed of 
the requisite informational 
foundation for a true 
relinquishment of the right. A right 
to choose requires not only the 
volition to prefer one option over 
the other, but also sufficient 
available information to make the 
preference meaningful. This is 
equally true whether the individual 
is choosing to forgo consultation 
with counsel, or choosing to 
relinquish to the police something 
which they otherwise have no 
right to take. 13 
Iacobucci, J. went on to 
consider the Crown's alternative 
argument that, even if the Court 
adopted the more broader ''waiver" test 
of Wills, the Crown had nonetheless 
established that Mr. Borden was 
sufficiently aware of the 
consequences of consenting to 
provide a blood sample. Specifically, 
the Crown submitted that it was 
reasonable to infer that Mr. Borden 
knew that the police had an open 
investigation concerning the October 
Assault, since he committed the 
assault, that he had left semen at the 
scene, and that he was aware that it 
was possible to compare his blood 
sample to semen samples. Iacobucci 
J. rejected this argument, noting that 
"the logical extension of this argument 
would be that the protections afforded 
by the Charter no longer apply 
whenever the person arrested is guilty 
of the offence for which he or she has 
been detained."14 
In considering the degree of 
awareness of the consequences that 
the Crown must establish, Iacobucci 
J. noted: 
The degree of awareness of 
consequences of a waiver of the 
s. 8 right required of an accused 
in a given case will depend on 
the particular facts. Obviously, it 
will not be necessary for the 
accused to have a detailed 
comprehension of every possible 
outcome of his or her consent. 
However, his or her 
understanding should include the 
fact that the police are also 
planning to use the product of the 
seizure in a different investigation 
from the one for which he or she 
is detained. Such was not the 
case here. Therefore, I conclude 
that the police seized the 
respondent's blood in relation to 
offence forming the subject 
matter of this charge. 15 
In applying this test to the facts of 
the case, Iacobucci J. also 
commented critically on the failure of 
the investigators to specifically 
disclose to Mr. Borden their intention 
to use the blood sample in their 
investigation of the October Assault. 
Given the circumstances in the case, 
Iacobucci, J. held that "it was 
incumbent upon the police, at a 
minimum, to make it clear to the 
respondent that they were treating his 
consent as a blanket consent to the 
use of the sample in relation to other 
offences in which he might be a 
suspect."16 Because of the police 
failure to advise Mr. Borden of their 
intentions, Iacobucci J. held that the 
police could not rely on Mr. Borden's 
consent to provide a blood sample as 
he was not sufficiently aware of the 
consequences of consenting to the 
procedure. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, in Wills and 
Borden, the courts clearly rejected the 
narrow ''voluntariness" approach to 
consent in favour of the broader 
"waiver" test. Thus, when police 
officers seek to rely on the consent 
of an individual to conduct a search, 
they must go further than simply 
satisfying themselves that the 
individual is acting freely and 
voh.,mtarily. Rather, they must also 
establish the individual was aware of 
the consequences of consenting to 
the search. Although Iacobucci, J. 
did not specifically adopt the six point 
test set out by Doherty J.A. in Wills, a 
police officer who seeks to rely on the 
consent of an individual as the basis 
for a search ought to ensure that these 
criteria are met. 
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If You Call 911, They Can Come: 
Entering Residences in Response to 911 Calls 
Introduction 
Recently, in R. v. Godoy, 1 the 
Supreme Court of Canada provided 
some important instruction to the police 
when entering residences in response 
to 911 calls. The following is a brief 
overview of Godoy and its application 
to 911 calls. 
Facts 
Police responded to a radio call of 
911 "unknown trouble" (i.e. phone call 
terminated before anyone spoke) at an 
apartment. Such calls were deemed 
by the police agency to be second in 
priority behind officer in distress calls. 
Based on the 911 trace, officers were 
dispatched to the originating address 
of the call. Due to the unknown feature 
of such calls, two primary and two back-
Craig S. MacMillan, LL.B., Ph.D. (Barrister and Solicitor) 
up officers were assigned to the call. 
The police arrived atthe apartment and 
knocked on the door. The door was 
opened partially by the accused and 
when asked about the call, he stated 
there was no problem. When asked 
by one officer if they could enter to 
investigate, the accused attempted to 
close the door. One officer stopped 
the door from being closed and they 
forcibly entered the apartment. Once 
inside, the police could hear a woman 
crying and found the common law 
spouse of the accused in a bedroom 
in a fetal position, sobbing. Swelling 
was observed over the left eye of the 
woman and she stated that the 
accused had hit her. Based on the 
circumstances, the police arrested the 
accused for assault. The accused 
resisted arrest and a finger of one 
officer was broken during the 
subsequent struggle. The accused was 
also charged with assaulting the police 
officer. At trial, the judge dismissed 
the assault police officer charge 
asserting that the entry by the police 
into the apartment was not authorized, 
and as a result, the police action and 
arrest were illegal. 
Analysis 
The SCC noted public policy 
requires that the police have the 
authority to investigate 911 calls, but 
the circumstances of each case will 
determine whether the police can enter 
a private dwelling house in response to 
such calls. If the conduct of the police 
constitutes a prima facie interference 
with a person's liberty or property, two 
questions arise for determination under 
the Waterfield Test2 : 1) did the police 
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"conduct fall within the general scope 
of any duty imposed by statute or 
recognized at common law"; and 2) 
did the police "conduct, albeit within 
the scope such a duty, involve an 
unjustifiable use of powers associated 
with the duty."3 
On the facts of this case, there 
was no question the police conduct 
constituted an interference with the 
accused's liberty and property. The 
first question then is whether or not 
the police had statutory or common 
law authority to enter the apartment? 
The SCC examined the provincial 
legislation governing the police, and 
found that it explicitly stated "A police 
officer has the powers and duties 
ascribed to a constable at common 
law.'14 Further, the SCC has previously 
held that 1) preservation of the peace, 
2) prevention of crime, and 3) the 
protection of life and property are 
duties that the police have at common 
law.5 
The SCC observed that: 
The point of the 911 emergency 
response system is to provide 
whatever assistance is required 
in the circumstances of the call. 
In the context of a disconnected 
911 call, the nature of the 
distress is unknown .... [l]t is 
reasonable, indeed imperative, 
that the police assume that the 
caller is in some distress and 
requires immediate assistance. 
To act otherwise would seriously 
impair the effectiveness of the 
system and undermine its very 
purpose. The police duty to 
protect life is therefore engaged 
whenever it can be inferred that 
the 911 caller is or may be in 
some distress, including cases 
where the call is disconnected 
before the nature of the 
emergency can be determined.6 
The next question, of course, is 
whether the conduct of the police in 
the circumstances of this case 
constituted an unjustifiable use of 
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police powers? The SCC accepted 
that the justifiability of a police officer's 
conduct will depend on a number of 
factors, including 1) the duty being 
performed, 2) the extent to which some 
interference with individual liberty is 
necessitated in order to perform the 
duty, 3) the importance of the 
performance of that duty to the public 
good, 4) the liberty interfered with, and 
5) the nature and extent of the 
interference. 7 
In the circumstances of this case, 
the sec found there was no other 
reasonable alternative to ensure that 
the disconnected caller received 
assistance in a timely manner, and 
rejected as "impractical" and 
"dangerous" the submission of the 
accused that the officers could have 
questioned neighbours or waited in the 
corridor for signs of further distress. 8 
As the Court rightly observed, "If a 911 
caller is in serious danger and is 
unable either to communicate with the 
911 dispatcher or answer the door 
upon police arrival, the caller's only 
hope is that the police physically locate 
him or her within the apartment and 
come to his or her aid."9 
While there is an unquestionable 
right to privacy in a residence, the 
interests of "dignity, integrity and 
autonomy" of the caller under the 
Charter are also at stake when a 911 
call is made. As such, the interest of 
a person who makes a 911 call is 
"closer to the core of the values of 
dignity, integrity and autonomy than 
the interest of the person who seeks 
to deny entry to police who arrive in 
response to the call for help."10 The 
Court concluded that the public 
interest in maintaining an effective 
emergency response system is 
obvious, which permits some limited 
intrusion to protect life and safety: the 
police have authority to be on private 
property to investigate the 911 calls, 
locate the caller (which may require a 
limited search), determine the reasons 
for making the call, and provide any 
assistance that may be required, but 
they do not have permission to 
generally search premises or 
otherwise intrude on privacy or 
property.11 
In this case, the police had a duty 
to respond to the 911 call, which 
extended to finding out the reason for 
the call. To meet the duty, the police 
could not accept the accused's 
assertion that there was no problem, 
and the police had the power to enter 
at common law to verify if there was 
an emergency. The attempt to close 
the door by the accused and deny the 
police entry contributed to the 
appropriateness of the forced entry. 
Once entry had been obtained, the 
police heard crying and they had a 
duty to search the apartment to find 
the source. 
Conclusion 
It is refreshing to have the SCC 
provide a relatively clear, concise and 
realistic judgement on the authority of 
the police to respond to emergency 
situations. Instead of circumscribing 
the police authority to respond to 
emergency situations, the sec has 
unequivocally endorsed the authority 
of the police to enter residences in 
response to 911 calls where the 
circumstances dictate such a course 
of action. However, as the SCC 
cautioned, this is not an unfettered 
authority and the interference with 
liberty and property by the police 
must be necessary for carrying out 
the police duty and it must be 
reasonable. 
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